



Defining futures



Formal Dependability Modeling and Analysis: A Survey

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CICM 2016
Bailystock, Poland

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Outline

- 1 Introduction and Motivation
- 2 Dependability Modeling Techniques
- 3 Formal Techniques for Dependability Analysis
- 4 Conclusions

Dependability



LG Multi Inverter Air Conditioners

We'll stand by you for 5 years

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Complete air con systems and parts

5-Year LG Warranty*
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


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ON EVERY NEW TOYOTA WE SELL!

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
Safety-critical Systems



- More stringent dependability requirements
 - Main motivation for **Formal Dependability Modeling and Analysis**

Dependability

Dependability




```
graph TD; A[Dependability] --> B[Reliability]; A --> C[ ]; A --> D[ ]
```


Reliability

The ability of system to
deliver services as
specified **within a given
time**

Dependability




Dependability



Formal Definitions

- **Reliability** = $\mathbb{P}(\text{no failure occurs before certain time})$


$$\begin{aligned} R(t) &= \Pr(X > t) \\ &= 1 - \Pr(X \leq t) \\ &= 1 - F_X(t) \end{aligned}$$



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
- **Availability** is typically derived from **reliability** and **maintainability** measures

- $$A(t) = \frac{MTBF}{MTBF + MTTR}$$


where $MTBF = MTTF + MTTR$

- MTBF = Mean time between failures (Reliability Metric)
- MTTF = Mean time to failure (Reliability Metric)
- MTTR = Mean time to repair (**Maintainability** Metric)


Traditional Dependability Analysis Steps




Traditional Dependability Analysis Steps



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Traditional Dependability Analysis Steps



Outline


- 1 Introduction and Motivation
- 2 Dependability Modeling Techniques**
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Dependability Modeling Techniques

- Some widely used modeling techniques are:
 - Reliability Block Diagram
 - Fault Tree
 - Markov Chain


Reliability Block Diagrams

- **Model** the failure relationship of system components as a diagram of **sub-blocks and connectors** (RBD)
- Judge the failure characteristics of the overall system based on the failure rates of sub-blocks







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


- The overall **system failure** happens if **all the paths for successful execution fail**
 - Add more parallelism to meet the dependability goals

Types of RBD

RBDs	Mathematical Expressions
	$R_{series}(t) = Pr(\bigcap_{i=1}^N E_i(t)) = \prod_{i=1}^N R_i(t)$
	$R_{parallel}(t) = Pr(\bigcup_{i=1}^M E_i) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^M (1 - R_i(t))$
	$R_{parallel-series}(t) = Pr(\bigcup_{i=1}^M \bigcap_{j=1}^N E_{ij}(t)) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^M (1 - \prod_{j=1}^N (R_{ij}(t)))$
	$R_{series-parallel}(t) = Pr(\bigcap_{i=1}^N \bigcup_{j=1}^M E_{ij}(t)) = \prod_{i=1}^N (1 - \prod_{j=1}^M (1 - R_{ij}(t)))$

Example: Power Supply System




- Waqar requires **continuous** supply of power for his Lab PC
 - The UPS can support the load during a switch from the main supply to the generator
- Wants to determine the **reliability** of power supply system


Example: Power Supply System

Step 1

Construct an RBD Model




Power Supply RBD




Example: Power Supply System

Step 1

Construct an RBD Model



Power Supply RBD



$$\text{pow_sys_rbd} = (M \cap T) \cup G \cup U$$

Example: Power Supply System

Step 2

Identify the RBD type


Step 3

Use the corresponding mathematical expression to evaluate the overall **reliability** based on the **sub-components reliability**




$$\mathbb{P}((\mathbf{M} \cap \mathbf{T}) \cup \mathbf{G} \cup \mathbf{U}) = 1 - (1 - \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{M}) * \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{T})) * (1 - \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{G})) * (1 - \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{U}))$$

Fault Tree

- A **graphical** method used to identify potential **causes** of system failure
- A **fault tree** is constructed having
 - **Events**: describing the failure of system components
 - **Logic Gates**: representing logical relationship between events
 - AND, OR, NOR, NAND, NOR etc.




Types of FT Gates

FT Gates	Failure Probability Expressions
	$F(t) = Pr(\bigcap_{i=2}^N A_i(t)) = \prod_{i=2}^N F_i(t)$
	$F(t) = Pr(\bigcup_{i=2}^N A_i(t)) = 1 - \prod_{i=2}^N (1 - F_i(t))$
	$F(t) = 1 - F_{OR}(t) = \prod_{i=2}^N (1 - F_i(t))$
	$F(t) = Pr(\bigcap_{i=2}^k \bar{A}_i(t) \cap \bigcap_{j=k}^N A_j(t)) = \prod_{i=2}^k (1 - F_i(t)) * \prod_{j=k}^N (F_j(t))$
	$F(t) = Pr(\bar{A}(t)B(t) \cup A(t)\bar{B}(t))$ $= F_A(t)(1 - F_B(t)) + F_B(t)(1 - F_A(t))$
	$F(t) = Pr(\bar{A}(t)) = (1 - F_A(t))$

Example: Power Supply System



- Determine the overall failure probability?



Fault Tree Analysis

Step 1



Construct a FT and represent Top Event in terms of basic events



Fault Tree Analysis

Step 1

Construct a FT and represent Top Event in terms of basic events



$$pow_sys_fail = (M \cup T) \cap G \cap U$$

Step 2

Evaluate **probability of failure** using the **Probabilistic Inclusion-Exclusion** principle

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n A_i\right) = \sum_{J \neq \emptyset, J \subseteq \{1, 2, \dots, n\}} (-1)^{|J|-1} \mathbb{P}\left(\bigcap_{j \in J} A_j\right)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}(\text{pow_sys_fail}) &= \mathbb{P}((M \cup T) \cap G \cap U) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(M \cap G \cap U) + \mathbb{P}(T \cap G \cap U) - \mathbb{P}(M \cap T \cap G \cap U)\end{aligned}$$

Step 3

Using **Mutual Independence** property

$$\mathbb{P}(pow_sys_fail) = \mathbb{P}(M) * \mathbb{P}(G) * \mathbb{P}(U) + \mathbb{P}(T) * \mathbb{P}(G) * \mathbb{P}(U) - \mathbb{P}(M) * \mathbb{P}(T) * \mathbb{P}(G) * \mathbb{P}(U)$$

Markov Chain


- Stochastic Process

- Markov Property

Markov Chain

- Stochastic Process

- A sequence of states
- Determining the next state is **random**




- Markov Property

Markov Chain

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


- Markov Property


- The probability of the next state is only dependent on the current state

$$\mathcal{Pr}\{X_{t_{n+1}} = f_{n+1} | X_{t_n} = f_n, \dots, X_{t_0} = f_0\} = \mathcal{Pr}\{X_{t_{n+1}} = f_{n+1} | X_{t_n} = f_n\}$$

Markov Chains - Types



Discrete-time Markov Chain



Continuous-time Markov Chain


Markov Chain - Example

- Weather Prediction Problem

Markov Chain - Example

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
- Waqar records the weather conditions (sunny or rainy/snowy) daily



Markov Chain - Example

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


- Based on this collected data he wants to obtain the probability of a specific weather pattern

Markov Chain - Example

- **Solution: Discrete Time Markov Chains**

- Set of States = {Sunny, Rainy}
- State Transition Probabilities can be obtained from the observed data
 - Example: $P\{\text{"Tomorrow is sunny"} \mid \text{"Today is sunny"}\}$



Comparison between Dependability Modeling Techniques

Features	Reliability Block Diagram	Fault Tree	Markov Chain

Comparison between Dependability Modeling Techniques

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Success Paths between input and output	✓		✓

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Non-combinatorial Problems (System is either inactive, failure or in standby state)			✓

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Large and Complex Systems	✓	✓	

Outline


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Formal Dependability Analysis Techniques

Dependability models have been analyzed extensively using the following formal techniques:

- Petri Nets
- Model Checking
- Higher-order-Logic Theorem Proving

- A Petri Net is a bipartite graph consisting of:



Places





Transitions





Tokens

- Transitions consume tokens from the input places and produce tokens in the output places

Example: Chemical Reaction



Example: Chemical Reaction



Dependability Analysis using Petri Nets:

- Colored PN (CPN) and Stochastic PN (SPN) have been extensively used for dependability analysis


Dependability Analysis using Petri Nets:

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- Analyzing RBDs and FTs with Petri Nets
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 - Internet voting System (Omidi et al. Computer & Comm. Eng., 2012)
 - High-speed Trains (Lijie et al. RESS-2012)
 - Logistic Supply Chain (Li et al. IJUNESST-2014)


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 - Logistic Supply Chain (Li et al. IJUNESST-2014)
- Analyzing Markov chains with PNs
 - Client Server Queuing system (Ibe et al. TPDS-1993)
 - Fibre Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) (Christodoulou et al. ETFA-1994)
 - Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite (Zeng et al. JMLC-2011)


Model Checking



Probabilistic Model Checking - Example




Probabilistic Model Checking - Example



- Probability of reaching State E from the State A:
 $0.4 \times 0.3 + 0.6 \times 0.4 \times 0.3 = 0.192$

Probabilistic Model Checking - Example



- Probability of reaching State E from the State A:
 $0.4 \times 0.3 + 0.6 \times 0.4 \times 0.3 = 0.192$
- Probabilities associated with the validity of **Temporal logic properties** can be verified


Dependability Analysis using Model Checking

- Several Probabilistic and Statistical model checking tools have been used for reliability/availability assesment
 - Probabilistic model checker (PRISM) (Baier et al. MIT Press 2008)
 - COMPASS: Based on the NuSMV and Markov Chain model checker (MRMC) (Bozanno et al. SAFECOMP-2009)
 - Erlangen-Twente Markov Chain Checker (ETMCC) (Hermanns et al. DSN-2013)


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- **Analysis of Real-world systems**
 - Aerospace systems (Bozanno et al. SAFECOMP-2009)
 - RAID disk protocol (Gopinath et al. Tech report 2009)
 - Herschel-Planck satellite system (Pend et al. Modeling Symp. 2013)
 - Airbag system (Pend et al. Modeling Symp. 2013)
 - e-health systems used in hospitals (Pervez et al. e-HEALTHCOMM-2014)

Higher-order-Logic Theorem Proving




HOL Theorem Proving - Example: Series RBD



$$R_{series}(t) = Pr(\bigcap_{i=1}^N A_i(t)) = \prod_{i=1}^N R_i(t)$$

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


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Theorem: Series RBD Reliability

$\vdash \forall p\ L. \text{ prob_space } p \wedge \neg \text{ NULL } L \wedge$
 $\text{ mutual_indep } p\ L \wedge \text{ in_events } p\ L \implies$
 $(\text{ prob } p\ (\text{ series_struct } p\ (\text{ rel_event_list } p\ L\ t)) =$
 $\text{ list_prod } (\text{ list_prob } p\ (\text{ rel_event_list } p\ L\ t)))$

● Probability Theory

-  J. Hurd (2002), PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge
Formal Verification of Probabilistic Algorithms.
-  O. Hasan (2008), PhD Thesis, Concordia University
Formal Probabilistic Analysis using Theorem Proving.
-  T. Mhamdi (2011), PhD Thesis, Concordia University
Information-Theoretic Analysis using Theorem Proving.
-  J. Hölzl (2012), PhD thesis, Technical University of Munich
Construction and Stochastic Applications of Measure Spaces in Higher-Order Logic.

- Dependability Analysis of a **Component**
 - Reconfigurable Memory Arrays (**Hasan et al. TC-2010**)
 - Combinational Circuits (**Hasan et al. JAL-2011**)
 - Electronic System Components (**Abbasi et al. WoLLIC-2014**)

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- Dependability Analysis using **RBDs and FTs**
 - Oil and Gas Pipelines (**Waqar et al. CICM-2014**)
 - WSN Transport Protocols (**Waqar et al. WiMob-2015**)
 - Logistic Supply Chain (**Waqar et al. IWIL-2015**)
 - Satellite Solar Array (**Waqar et al. CICM-2015**)

Comparison between Dependability Analysis Techniques

Feature	Paper-and-pencil Proof	Simulation Tools	Petri Nets	Theorem Proving	Model Checking

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Feature	Paper-and-pencil Proof	Simulation Tools	Petri Nets	Theorem Proving	Model Checking
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Accuracy	✓ (?)		✓	✓	✓
Automation		✓	✓		✓

Outline

- 1 Introduction and Motivation
- 2 Dependability Modeling Techniques
- 3 Formal Techniques for Dependability Analysis
- 4 Conclusions

Conclusion

- Dependability
 - Reliability
 - Availability
 - Maintainability

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Future Directions:

- Analysis of **Dynamic RBDs and FTs**
- Using **Theorem Proving to conduct Markov Chains** based dependability analysis
 - Foundational Support is available in HOL4 (**L. Liu et al., ATVA-2011**) and Isabelle/HOL (**J. Hölzl et al., TACAS 2012**)

Thanks!



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